0uke 


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Duke  University  Library 


RESUME 


<^r^OF^z^> 


Operations  Against  Apache  Indians. 


1882    TO    1886 


c^r^BY 


BRIGADIER  GEN'L  GEORGE  CROOK, 


XT.    S.     ^.RMY 


1886. 


Pamphlet  Collection 
Duke  Uniyersfcy  Library 


HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  PLATTE, 

Omaha,  Nebraska,  December  27,  1886. 

Tin  Adjutant  General,  U.  8.  Arm//. 
Wax/n/tgton,  D.  C. 

Sir: 

As  the  Chiricahua  Apache  campaign  has  ended  with  the  surrender 
of  Geronimo.  Mangos,  Natchez  and  Chihuahua,  with  their  followers, 
and  as  the  official  reports  connected  therewith  have  been  submitted 
and  published,  in  view  of  my  long  service  in  connection  with  the 
troubles  of  which  these  Indians  were  the  cause,  I  deem  it 
proper  to  submit  the  following  resume  of  operations  in  Arizona, 
for  the  information  of  the  War  Department,  to  be  published  and 
then  placed  on  file,  as  a  part  of  the  history  of  our  Indian  troubles 
in  that  Territory. 

An  experience  obtained  in  eight  years  of  service  in  Arizona  ena- 
ble^ me  to  speak  with  a  certain  authority  on  this  question,  and  jus- 
tifies the  forwarding  of  this  paper  on  a  subject  which,  during  the 
past  year,  has  attracted  no  small  degree  of  public  attention  and  in- 
terest. 

Upon  assuming  command  of  the  Department  of  Arizona,  in  1882, 
a  careful  and  thorough  investigation  revealed  the  existence  of  any- 
thing but  a  satisfactory  state  of  affairs.  The  Indians  generalby 
were  sullen,  and  distrustful  of  all  white  men;  many  were  on  the 
verge  of  war,  and  some  were  in  open  hostilities.  There  was  a  gen- 
eral feeling  of  uneasiness  among  the  whites,  and  the  business  inter- 
ests of  the  Territory  were  paralyzed  by  the  uncertainties  of  the  sit- 
uation. 

Since  my  departure  from  the  Territory  in  1875,  its  property  in- 
terests had  largely  increased  in  value,  and  these  interests  and  the 
lives  of  citizens  engaged  in  peaceful  pursuits,  demanded  protection. 

Such  being  the  condition  of  affairs,  it  was  therefore  required  of 
any  line  of  policy  adopted,  that  it  be  directed  to  the  attainment  of 
three  main  objects: — the  maintenance  of  control  over  the  Indians 
remaining  on  the  reservations,  the  protection  of  life  and  property 
of  citizens,  and  the  subjugation  of  the  hostiles. 

The  first  of  these  objects  would  undoubtedly  be  attained,  in  the 


most  permanent  and  satisfactory  way,  could  the  Indians  themselves 
be  brought  up  to  a  degree  of  civilization  sufficient  to  render  them 
harmless  to  settlers,  self-sustaining  and  subordinate  to  authority. 
To  raise  and  elevate  the  condition  of  the  Indian  himself,  was  the 
object  to  which  my  first  attention  was  directed. 

Fortunately.  I  was  able  to  command  the  respect  and  confidence  of 
the  Indians  then  on  the  reservation,  and  who  had  been  under  my  con- 
trol in  1871-75.  It  was  essential  not  only  that  this  confidence  in  me 
should  be  retained,  but  to  produce  the  best  and  most  lasting  results, 
that  it  should  also  be  extended  to  the  whites  generally. 

first  step  to  this  end,  the  following  order  was  published  to 
the  troops  of  the  Department: 

•HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  ARIZONA. 

Whipple  Barracks.  Prescott.  A.  T..  October 5,  1882. 

General  Orders,  j 
No.  43.  f 

The  Commanding  General,  after  making  a  thorough  and  exhaus- 
tive examination  among  the  Indians  of  the  eastern  and  southern 
part  of  this  Territory,  regrets  to  say  that  he  finds  among  them  a 
general  feeling  of  distrust,  and  want  of  confidence  in  the  whites — 
especially  the  soldiery:  and  also  that  much  dissatisfaction,  danger- 
ous to  the  peace  of  the  country,  exists  among  them. 

Officers  and  soldiers  serving  in  this  Department  are  reminded 
that  one  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  military  character  is. 
justice  to  all— Indians  as  well  as  white  men--and  that  a  disregard 
of  this  principle  is  likely  to  bring  about  hostilities,  and  cause  the 
death  of  the  very  persons  whom  they  are  sent  here  to  protect. 

In  all  their  dealings  with  the  Indians,  officers  must  be  careful  not 
only  to  observe  the  strictest  fidelity,  but  to  make  no  promises  not 
in  their  power  to  cany  out:  all  grievance-,  arising  within  their  jur- 
isdiction, should  be  redressed,  so  that  an  accumulation  of  them 
may  not  cause  an  outbreak.  Grievances,  however  petty,  if  per- 
mitted to  accumulate,  will  be  like  embers  that  smolder  and  event- 
ually break  into  flame. 

When  officers  are  applied  to  for  the  employment  of  force  against 
Indians,  the}"  should  thoroughly  satisfy  themselves  of  the  necessity 
for  the  application,  and  of  the  legality  of  compliance  therewith,  in 
order  that  they  ma}'  not,  through  the  inexperience  of  others,  or 
through  their  own  hastiness,  allow  the  troops  under  them  to  become 
the  instruments  of  oppression. 


3 

There  must  be  no  division  of  responsibility  in  this  matter;  each 
officer  will  be  held  to  a  strict  accountability  that  his  actions  have 
been  fully  authorized  by  law  and  justice,  and  that  Indians  evincing 
a  desire  to  enter  upon  a  career  of  peace  shall  have  no  cause  for  com- 
plaint through  hasty  or  injudicious  acts  of  the  military. 

By  Order  of  Brigadier  General  Crook: 

[Signed.]  J.  P.  MARTIN. 

Ass't  Adjutant  General." 

But  this  alone  would  do  little;  the  Indians  themselves  had  to  be 
reached,  and  authority  established  over  them,  before  they  could  in 
any  way  be  controlled,  or  their  condition  advanced  beyond  the  prim- 
itive savageiy  in  which  they  existed. 

Some  of  the  leaders  of  the  different  bands  were  interviewed,  and 
were,  by  various  means,  induced  to  exert  their  influence  for  the 
maintenance  of  order.  These  Indians  the  more  readily  yielded  to 
control  because  of  their  previous  acquaintance  with  me  in  1871-75. 
when  I  had  subjugated  and  placed  over  five  thousand  of  them  on 
the  reservation.  But  the  Chiricahua  and  Warm  Spring  Apaches, 
during  my  former  administration  in  Arizona,  had  been  excepted 
from  my  control,  and  had  escaped  the  punishment  due  them  for 
their  outrages. 

The  Chiricahuas  had  been  given  a  reservation  south  of  the  present 
line  of  the  Southern  Pacific  Railway,  on  the  borders  of  Mexico.  I 
was  prohibited  from  interfering  in  any  manner  with  their  manage- 
ment, and  was  not  able  even  to  learn  the  terms  upon  which  this 
reservation  was  given  to  them. 

The  reservation  of  the  Warm  Spring  Apaches  was  in  New  Mexico 
at  the  Ojo  Caliente,  and  therefore  outside  the  limits  of  my  com- 
mand. Subsecpiently  some  members  of  these  bands  were  induced 
to  remove  to  the  White  Mountain  Reservation,  but  prior  to  my  re- 
assignment to  the  command  in  1882,  the}r  had  all  left  it,  and  were 
located  in  the  Sierra  Madre  in  Mexico,  where  their  pres- 
ence was  a  constant  menace  to  the  people  living  within  the  terri- 
tory subject  to  their  depredations,  which  extended  on  both  sides  of 
the  international  boundary.  While  these  Indians  remained  off  the 
reservations,  life  and  property  within  the  exposed  limits  would  be 
unsafe,  and  it  was  determined  to  effect  their  return. 

The  raid  of  Chatto  in  March,  1883,  enabled  me,  without  violation 
of  treaty  stipulations,  to  follow  this  band  to  the  Chiricahua  strong- 
holds in  the  Sierra  Madre. 


The  details  of  this  expedition  were  fully  set  forth  in  my  annual 
report  for  1883,  and  need  not  be  repeated  here.  It  is  sufficient  to 
state  that  it  resulted  in  the  surrender  of  all  the  renegades— not  only 
those  who  had  at  any  time  lived  on  the  reservation,  hut  also  those 
who.  when  their  bands  had  been  moved  from  the  Warm  Springs 
and  Chiricuhua  Reservations  to  the  White  Mountain  Reserve,  had 
escaped  to  the  Sierra  Madre.  In  compliance  with  the  surrender 
then  made,  over  600  souls.  130  being  men  and  boys  capable  of  bear- 
ing arms,  were  brought  to  the  reservation,  their  status  being  nomi- 
nally that  of  prisoners  of  war.  At  this  time,  the  Chiricahuas 
were  the  wildest  and  fiercest  Indians  on  the  continent:  savage  and 
brutal  by  instinct,  they  hesitated  no  more  at  taking  human  life, 
when  excited  by  passion,  than  in  killing  a  rabbit.  For  more  than 
two  centuries  they  had  been  a  thorn  in  the  flesh  of  the  Spaniards, 
and  although  during  this  time,  almost  constant  warfare  had  been 
carried  on.  all  efforts  to  conquer  these  tigers  of  the  human  race 
by  force  of  arms,  had  been  fruitless. 

For  centuries  the  Apaches  had  been  subjected  to  hardships  and 
privations  which  began  with  their  birth  and  ended  only  with  their 
lives.  The  mountain  country  in  which  they  lived  furnished  all 
that  was  necessary  for  their  existence.  The  advance  of  a  people  to 
even  the  simplest  form  of  civilization  is  marked  by  the  creation  of 
artificial  necessities.  The  Apache  was  independent  of  these,  and 
his  contact  with  the  whites  led  him  to  adopt,  only  their  weapons. 
They  resented  anything  like  an  attempt  to  regulate  their  conduct, 
or  in  any  way  to  interfere  with  their  mode  of  life. 

The  problem  presented  was  to  bring  under  control,  reduce  to  sub- 
ordination, and  civilize,  so  far  as  was  possible,  these  Indians,  to 
whose  restive  natures,  restraint  of  any  kind  was  unknown.  In  ac- 
cepting their  surrender.  I  was  deeply  sensible  of  the  responsibility 
which  I  assumed,  but  I  believed  then,  and  believe  now.  that  in  no 
other  way  could  I  hope  to  put  an  end  to  the  constant  raids  to  which 
Arizona  and  Xew  Mexico  had,  for  generations,  been  subjected  by 
these  Indians.  Their  regeneration  could  be  a  work  only  of  time, 
and  of  the  most  patient  watchfulness  and  care. 

They  were  placed  under  the  charge  of  officers  in  whose  ability 
and  discretion  I  reposed  great  confidence.  Confidential  In- 
dians were  employed  as  secret  service  scouts,  and  kept  con- 
stantly in  the  camps  of  the  savages,  to  observe  their  every 
movement,  to  listen  to  their  conversation  and  report  their  demeanor. 
Indians  of  their  own  tribe  were  selected,  preferably  the  most  influ- 


ential  and  energetic  of  their  number,  who  were  enlisted  and  paid 
as  scouts,  and  every  effort  was  made  to  gain  their  confidence  and 
secure  their  co-operation.  By  this  means,  the  several  bands  were 
disintegrated,  divisions  created  among  them  and.  by  degrees,  a  fol- 
lowing obtained  that  was  interested  in  repressing  disorder.  This 
step  gained,  it  became  possible  to  go  farther,  and,  by  exercising  the 
greatest  discretion,  to  punish  offenders.  Whenever  it  was  practica- 
ble, this  was  caused  to  be  done  by  the  Indians  themselves,  and  in 
this  way  several  of  the  prominent  young  "'bucks"  were  arrested 
while  fomenting  discontent,  tried  by  Indian  juries,  by  them  sen- 
tenced and  severely  punished.  Disorders  repressed  in  this  way  not 
only  accustomed  them  to  a  certain  degree  of  self  government,  but 
were  most  invaluable  in  cultivating  a  spirit  of  subordination  among 
them.  By  these  and  other  methods,  too  numerous  to  describe  here, 
and  which  have  been  set  forth  more  in  detail  in  my  annual,  and 
other  reports,  for  1883-84-85,  these  wild  and  reckless  spirits  were 
brought  under  control,  and  were  gradually  set  at  work  farming,  in 
which  the  labor  was  performed  not  only  by  the  women,  but  also  by 
the  men.  This,  too,  was  accomplished  without  violent  shock  to 
their  prejudices,  and  without  exciting  their  suspicions. 

It  is  impossible  to  estimate  the  discouraging  effect  of  the  obsta- 
cles, against  which  it  was  necessary  to  contend  in  following  out 
these  methods  to  a  finally  successful  issue;  the  unfriendly  criticism 
of  the  Territorial  press,  the  more  or  less  open  and  always  covert  op- 
position of  the  Indian  Department,  up  to  the  time  of  the  outbreak 
in  1885;  the  undisguised  hostility  of  the  numerous  rings  of  con- 
tractors and  speculators,  whose  success  depended  upon  their  ability 
to  defraud  the  Indians;  all  these  adverse  elements  had  to  be  over- 
come, and  against  such  odds,  success  would  have  been  impossible, 
except  for  the  zealous  co-operation  of  such  men  as  Captain  Craw- 
ford, Lieutenant  Gatewood,  Lieutenant  Britton  Davis,  and  others 
associated  with  them  in  the  management  of  Indian  affairs  on  the 
White  Mountain  Reservation.  These  officers  constantly  carried 
their  lives  in  their  hands;  the  service  in  which  the}'  were  engaged 
was  one  of  the  greatest  possible  delicacy  and  danger,  where  the 
slightest  indiscretion  would  have  proved  fatal  to  them.  But  it 
seemed,  in  my  judgment,  the  only  way  in  which  the  Indians  could 
be  reached  and  taught  that  subordination  to  authority,  which  is  an 
essential  requisite  to  any  degree  of  advancement,  however  slight, 
toward  a  state  of  civilization.  For  this  reason  I  allowed  officers,  the 
value  of  whose  lives  was  inestimable,  to  engage  in  the  most  dan- 
gerous duty  that  ever  falls  to  the  lot  of  soldiers  to  perform. 


6 

The  method  indicated  above  had  been  applied  with  success  to  the 
management  of  the  other  Apaches  who.  it  should  be  remembered, 
were  in  1871,  in  all  respects  as  brutally  savage  as  these  Chiricahuas 
were  in  1883,  and  there  was  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  same 
means  which  had  proved  so  effective  with  the  former,  would  produce 
equally  good  results  with  the  latter:  and  they  did,  in  fact.  For  the  first 
time  in  their  history,  they  were  placed  under  restraint  and  taught 
subordination,  while  at  the  same  time  they  made  rapid  progress  to- 
ward self  government,  and  complete  self-support.  For  more  than 
two  years  Arizona  and  Xew  Mexico  enjoyed  a  respite  from  Indian 
troubles,  during  which  period  not  an  outrage  or  depredation  of  any 
kind  was  committed  in  the  United  States  by  an  Apache  Indian. 
This  was  the  first  time,  within  the  memory  of  man,  that  there  were 
no  Apache  Indians  on  the  war-path.  During  this  period  the  ques- 
tion of  the  management  of  the  Chiricahuas  was  practically  settled. 
I  had  gained  their  confidence  to  such  an  extent  that  I  am  firmly 
convinced  that  had  I  known  of  the  occurrences  reported  in  Lieu- 
tenant Davis'  telegram  of  May  15,  1885.  which  I  did  not  see  until 
months  afterwards,  the  outbreak  of  Mangus  and  Geronimo,  a  few 
days  later,  would  not  have  occured.  As  it  was.  though  nearly  all 
the  prominent  chiefs  except  Chatto  were  among  the  renegades, 
than  one-third  of  the  fighting  strength  left  the  reservation.  Over 
eighty  men  and  three  hundred  and  fifty  women  and  children  still 
remained  on  their  farms.  Although  the  hard  and  conscientious 
work  expended  upon  these  Chiricahuas  did  not  prevent  a  portion  of 
them  leaving  the  reservation,  it  enabled  me  to  select  with  certainty 
of  faithful  service,  lift}'  of  those  remaining,  for  enlistment  as  scouts. 
I  should  have  enlisted  more,  except  for  the  reason,  that  I  wished 
the  rest  to  remain,  to  protect  the  women  and  children  from 
hostile  raids.  These  Indians  were  selected  as  scouts,  in  preference 
to  those  belonging  to  other  bands  of  the  Apaches,  for  the  reasons 
that  they  were  thoroughly  familiar  with  the  country  in  which  they 
would  be  required  to  operate;  they  were  superior  as  soldiers  to  any 
other  Indians,  and  fully  up  to  the  standard  of  the  renegades. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  in  this  paper  to  present  the  details  of  opera- 
tions against  the  hostile  Chiricahuas.  as  they  have  already  been 
fully  discussed  in  my  annual  reports  for  1885  and  1880.  to  which 
attention  is  invited.  As.  however,  the  surrender  of  the  renegades 
to  me  in  March  1886,  has  been  made  the  subject  of  much  discussion 
in  the  public  press,  and  indeed  has,  in  some  quarters,  been  curious- 
ly misrepresented,  it  is  deemed  proper  to  insert  in  full,  the  follow- 
ing corresjiondence  relating  thereto: 


Headquarters  Departme'nt  of  Arizona. 

In  tfu  Field,  Fort  Bowie,  A.  T..  September  17,  1885. 

TTu  Adjutant  < 

Division  of  the  Pacific 
Sir: 

It  has  been  my  intention  to  turn  over  to  the  civil  authorities 
any  hostile  bucks  captured,  for  trial  under  the  provisions  of  Sec.  9, 
of  the  Act  of  Congress,  approved  March  3,  1885,  with  reference  to 
jurisdiction  of  the  courts  over  certain  offenses  committed  by  In- 
dians. But  upon  consultation  with  several  prominent  lawyers  on 
the  subject.  I  am  assured  that  it  will  be  impossible  to  secure  con. 
viction  in  the  civil  courts,  owing  to  the  impossibility  of  obtaining 
evidence  against  individual  Indians,  and  that  the  same  difficulty 
will  lie  experienced  in  obtaining  proof  should  the  Indians  be  indict- 
ed for  conspiracy.  Unless  aided  by  some  stroke  of  good  fortune,  it 
will  take  years  to  kill  all  these  hostiles  situated  as  they  are,  and  so 
leu--  as  any  of  them  remain  out  in  the  mountains,  life  and  property 
will  be  unsafe  within  their  reach  and  it  will  be  impossible  to  pre- 
vent their  depredations. 

It  is  desirable  to  have  them  surrender  and  this  they  will  not  do 
if  they  think  they  are  to  be  killed,  or  what  they  believe  is  worse, 
turned  over  to  the  civil  authorities. 

It  is  believed  the}-  could  be  induced  to  surrender  after  a  little 
more  hammering,  if  they  are  assured  that  their  lives  would  not  be 
forfeited  and  that  they  would  simply  be  transported.  Please  give 
decision  by  telegraph. 

It  is  important  that  this  matter  should  not  gain  publicity,  so  as 
to  get  to  the  ears  of  the  Indian-. 

Very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 
{Sgd.)  George  Crook, 

Brigadier  General, 

Commanding. 


In  reply  to  this  letter,  the  following  telegram  was   received  Oc- 
tober 8th,  1885: 

Headquarters  Division  Pacific. 
Prusido  Sm,  Francisco,  California,  Octobers,  1885. 

General  Crook, 

Fort  Bowie,  A.  T. 


8 

The  following  dispatch  is  repeated  for  your  information  and 
action.     Please  acknowledge  receipt. 

By  command  of  Major  General  Pope: 
(Sgd.)  Taylor, 

Aide- de- Camp. 

"Referring  to  General  Crook's  application,  dated  September 
"seventeenth,  inquiring  whether  promise  can  be  made  to  hostile 
"Chiricahuas  that  their  lives  shall  not  he  forfeited  if  they  surrender, 
"the  Secretary  of  War  approves  a  recommendation  of  the  Lieutenant 
"General  that  General  Crook  be  authorized  to  secure  the  surrender 
"of  the  Chiricahuas  now  at  large  upon  terms  of  their  being  held  as 
"prisoners  of  war,  but  it  must  be  understood  that  any  negotiation 
"looking  to  their  surrender  must  include  all  hostile  Chiricahuas, 
"and  that  as  soon  as  the  surrender  is  made  that  they  at  once  be 
"sent  under  suitable  guard  for  confinement  at  Fort  Marion,  Fla. 
"Please  so  inform  General  Crook  by  telegraph  and  direct  him  to 
"acknowledge  receipt.  Xo  publicity  must  be  given  as  to  the 
"intentions  of  the  Government  in  this  matter  beyond  what  is 
"absolutely  necessary  in  communicating  with  the  Indians. 

"(Sgd.)  R.  C.  Drum, 

'  'A dj  a ta  n  t  Gen t  ra I. ' ' 


After  the  receipt  of  information  of  Crawford's  fight,  his  subse- 
quent death,  and  the  request  of  the  hostiles  for  a  personal  interview 
with  me,  the  following  dispatch  was  received: 

Headquarters  Army  of  the  United  States. 

Washington,  D.  C,  February  1st,  1S86. 

General  George  Crook, 

Fort  Buirie.  Arizona. 
I  had  a  consultation  with  the  President  last  Thursday  afternoon 
on  the  subject  of  Lieutenant  Maus'  dispatch.  He  fully  understands 
the  instructions  under  which  you  can  act  transmitted  to  you  Septem- 
ber 30,  18S5.  but  desires  me  to  notify  you  to  make  no  promises  at 
all  to  the  hostiles.  unless  it  is  necessary  to  secure  their  surrender. 

id.)  P.  H.  Sheridan. 

Lieutenant  General. 


In  compliance  with  the  authority  contained  in  the  above  com- 
munications, I  proceeded  to  the   point  where  the  Indians  were  in 


9 

camp,  and  on  March  35th,  1886,  had  my  fir>t  interview  with  them. 
A  full  report  of  the  conference  is  attached  to  my  report  of  opera- 
tions against  the  hostile  Chiricahuas,  marked  "M",  to  which  refer- 
ence is  made.  I  found  the  hostiles,  though  tired  of  the  constant 
hounding  of  the  campaign,  in  superb  physical  condition,  armed  to  the 
teeth,  and  with  an  abundance  of  ammunition.  In  manner  they  were 
suspicious,  and  at  the  same  time  independent  and  self-reliant. 
After  my  first  interview,  I  telegraphed  the  Lieutenant  General  as 
follows: 

Camp  El  Canon  de  Los  Embudos, 
Twenty  miles  S.  E.  San  Bernardino,  Mexico,  March  JG,  1886. 
Via  Fort  Bowie,  Arizona,  March  28,  1S86. 

Lieut.  General  P.  II  Sheridan, 

Washington,  D.  C. 
I  met  the  hostiles  yesterday  at  Lt.  Maus*  Camp,  they  being  lo- 
cated about  five  hundred  yards  distant.  I  found  them  very  inde- 
pendent and  as  fierce  as  so  many  tigers, — knowing  what  pitiless 
brutes  they  are  themselves  the}-  mistrust  every  one  else.  After  my 
talk  with  them  it  seemed  as  if  it  would  be  impossible  to  get  any 
hold  on  them  except  on  conditions  that  they  be  allowed  to  return 
to  the  reservation  on  their  old  status.  To-day  things  look  more 
favorable. 

(Sgd.)  George  Crook, 

Brigadier  General. 


That  evening  spies  managed  to  get  among  them,  and  in  this  way 
their  feelings  both  toward  each  other,  and  toward  their  pursuers 
were  ascertained.  On  information  gained  in  this  way  it  was  possible 
to  shape  a  policy.  Though  it  is  believed  that  all  the  hostiles  had  im- 
plicit confidence  in  me,  I  preferred  to  work  on  individuals,  and  se- 
lected Chihuahua  and  Natchez, who  were  the  most  influential  leaders 
of  the  renegades, and  concentrated  my  efforts  upon  them.  From  the 
scouts  were  selected  trustworthy  Indians  of  their  own  tribe,  who 
were  carefully  instructed,  and  sent  to  talk  with  these  chiefs,  who 
finally  agreed  to  surrender,  on  terms  the  most  favorable  I  could 
hope  to  exact.  This  at  once  divided  the  hostiles  into  two  parties, 
and  broke  up  the  band.  The  fact  that  this  had  been  effected  through 
the  personal  efforts  of  their  own  people,  had  an  effect  not  only  of  a 
peculiarly  demoralizing  nature  upon  the  hostiles,  but  also  upon  all 
others  of  the  tribe,  and  rendered  their  subsequent  management  any- 
where, an  easy  matter.      Before  this,  merely  to  have  hinted  at  the 


10 

possibility  of  their  removal  from  their  old  haunts  would  simply  have 
stampeded  the  whole  tribe  to  the  mountains. 

These  results  may  be  traced  directly  to  the  work  that  had  been 
done  among  these  Indians  during  the  two  years  they  had  been  on 
the  reservation,  and  were  followed  on  the  next  day  by  the  surren- 
der of  the  whole  body  of  hostiles,  which  fact  was  communicated 
to  the  Lieutenant  General  in  the  following  telegram: 


Camp  el  Caxox  de  Los  Embudos,  Mexico, 
March  27ih,  1886,  via  Fort  Bowie,  Arizona,  March  29th,  1SS6. 
Lt.  General  P.  II.  Sheridan,   U.  8.  A., 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Confidential. 

In  a  conference  with  Geronimo  and  other  Chiricahuas,  I  told 
them  that  they  must  decide  at  once  upon  unconditional  surrender 
or  fight  it  out.  That  in  the  latter  event  hostilities  should  be  com- 
menced at  once  and  the  last  one  of  them  killed  if  it  took  fifty  years. 
I  told  them  to  reflect  on  what  they  were  to  do  before  giving  me 
their  answer.  The  only  propositions  they  would  entertain  were 
these  three.  That  they  should  be  sent  east  for  not  exceeding  two 
(2)  years,  taking  with  them  such  of  their  families  as  so  desired, 
leaving  at  Apache,  Nana  who  is  TO  years  old  and  superannuated;  or 
that  they  should  all  return  to  the  reservation  on  their  old  status;  or 
else  return  to  the  war  path  with  its  attendant  horrors.  As  I  had  to 
act  at  once.  I  have  to-day  accepted  their  surrender  upon  the  first 
proposition. 

Ka-e-te-na,  the  young  chief,  who  less  than  two  years  ago  was 
the  worst  Chiricahua  of  the  whole  lot,  is  now  perfectly  subdued. 
He  is  thoroughly  reconstructed,  has  rendered  me  valuable  assist- 
ance, and  will  be  of  great  service  in  helping  to  control  these  In- 
dians in  the  future.  His  stay  at  Alcatraz  has  worked  a  complete 
reformation  in  his  character.  I  have  not  a  doubt  that  similar  treat- 
ment will  produce  same  result^  with  the  whole  band  and  by  the  end 
of  that  time,  the  excitement  will  have  died  away.  Mangus  with 
thirteen  (13)  Chiricahuas,  six*  (6)  of  whom  are  bucks,  is  not  with 
the  other  Chiricuhuas.  He  separated  from  them  in  August  last  and 
has  since  held  no  communication  with  them.  He  has  committed  no 
depredations.  As  it  would  be  likely  to  take  at  least  a  year  to  find 
him  in  the  immense  ranges  of  mountains  to  the  south,  I  think  it 
inadvisable  to  attempt  any  search  at  this  time,  especially  as  he  will 


♦There  were  but  ?,  men  with  Mangus,  as  was  ascertained  subsequent  to  the 
time  of  writing  this  telegram. 


11 

undoubtedly  give  himself  up  as  soon    as  he  hears  what  the   others 
have  done. 

I  start  for  Bowie  to-morrow  morning  to  reach  there  next  night. 
I  respectfully  request  to  be  informed  whether  or  not  my  action  has 
been  approved  and  also  that  full  instructions  meet  me  at  that  point. 
The  Chiricahuas  start  for  Bowie  to-morrow  with  the  Apache  Scouts 
under  Lieut.  Maus. 

(Sgd.)  George  Crook, 

Brigadier  General. 


There  is  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  their  surrender  was  made 
in  good  faith.  The  fact  that  Geronimo  and  Natchez,  having  been 
tilled  with  fiery  mescal,  and  alarmed  by  the  lies  of  a  designing  man, 
stampeded  on  the  route  to  Fort  Bowie  with  a  party  of  their  follow- 
ing, was  an  unfortunate, but  not  irreparable  accident.  The  men  sent 
to  Fort  Marion  were  among  the  bravest  and  ablest  of  the  renegades; 
the  old  chief  Nana,  despite  his  age,  was  the  acknowledged  brains 
of  the  band,  Chihuahua  and  Josanie  were  their  most  influential 
leaders;  while  among  the  prisoners  were  two  wives  and  three  child- 
ren of  Geronimo,  the  family  of  Natchez,  and  also  relatives,  or  some 
members  of  the  families  of  all  that  remained  out. 

It  was  only  necessary  to  communicate  with  the  renegades. 
which,  with  the  aid  of  the  scouts,  would  have  been  a  mat- 
ter of  but  little  difficulty  when  they  had  recovered  from  their 
fright,  and  had  time  to  consider  the  position  in  which  they  were 
placed,  and  the  trouble  would,  in  all  probability,  have  been  settled 
without  further  bloodshed.  This  course  would  have  been  adopted, 
but  my  relief  from  the  command  of  the  Department  prevented 
such  action  being  taken. 

The  voluntary  return  of  two  of  the  Indians  who  had  been  stam- 
peded on  this  occasion,  is  a  very  significant  fact  when  considered 
with  reference  to  this  line  of  policy.  * 

The  following  telegraphic  correspondence  shows  clearly  all  re- 
maining facts  connected  with  the  surrender  of  the  hostiles: 


Headquarters  Department  op  Arizona. 

In  the  Field.  Fort  Bowie.  A.  T..  March  30th,  1886. 
Lieut.  General  P.  H.  Sheridan. 
Washington.  T>.  C. 
A  courier  just  in  from  Lieutenant  Maus  reports  that  during  last 
night  Geronimo  and  Natchez  with  twenty  men  and  thirteen  women 

*In  communication  of  April  4,  infra  p.  17. 


12 

left  his  camp  taking  no  stock.  He  states  that  there  was  no  ap- 
parent cause  for  their  leaving.  Two  dispatches  received  from  him 
this  morning  reported  everything  going  on  well  and  the  Chiricahuas 
in  good  spirits.  Chihuahua  and  twelve  men  remained  behind. 
Lieut.  Maus  with  his  scouts,  except  enough  to  take  the  other  pri- 
soners to  Bowie,  have  gone  in  pursuit. 

(Sgd.)  George  Crook, 

Brigadier  General. 


Headquarters  Army  of  the  United  States, 

Washington,  D.  C.  March  30th,  1886. 
Telegram. 
General  George  Crook, 

Fort  Boicie,  Arizona. 
You  are  confidentially  informed  that  your  telegram  of  March 
29th  is  received.  The  President  cannot  assent  to  the  surrender  of 
the  hostiles  on  the  terms  of  their  imprisonment  East  for  two  years 
with  the  understanding  of  their  return  to  the  reservation.  He  in- 
structs you  to  enter  again  into  negotiations  on  the  terms  of  their 
unconditional  surrender,  only  sparing  their  lives.  In  the  meantime 
and  on  the  receipt  of  this  order  you  are  directed  to  take  every  pre- 
caution against  the  escape  of  the  hostiles,  which  must  not  be  al- 
lowed under  any  circumstances.  You  must  make  at  once  such  dis- 
position of  }Tour  troops  as  will  insure  against  further  hostilities  by 
completing  the  destruction  of  the  hostiles,  unless  these  terms  are 
acceded  to. 

(Sgd.)  P.  H.  Sheridan, 

Lieutenant  General. 


Headquarters  Army  of  the  United  States. 

Washington,  D.  G,  March  31st,  1886. 

Telegram. 
General  George  Crook, 

Fort  Bowie.  Arizona. 
Your  dispatch  of  yesterday  received.     It  has  occasioned  great 
disappointment.     It  seems  strange  that  Geronimo   and  party  could 
have  escaped  without  the  knowledge  of  the  scouts. 

(Sgd.)  P.  H.  Sheridan. 

Lieutenant  General. 


13 

Headquarters  Department  of  Arizona. 

In  the  Field,  For1  Bowie,  A.  T..  March  Slzt,  1886. 

Lieut.  General  P.  II.  Sheridan. 
Washington,  D.  C. 
Your  dispatch  of  the  thirty -first  received.  There  can  be  no 
question  that  the  scouts  were  thoroughly  loyal  and  would  have  pre- 
vented the  hostiles  leaving  had  it  been  possible.  When  they  left 
their  camp  with  our  scouts  they  scattered  over  the  country  so  as  to 
make  surprise  impossible  and  they  selected  their  camp  with  this  in 
view,  nor  would  they  all  remain  in  camp  at  one  time.  They  kept 
more  or  less  full  of  mescal.  They  had  so  tamed  down  since  we 
first  met  them  that  some  of  the  most  prominent  were  hunting  their 
ponies  unarmed  the  evening  of  the  night  they  left. 

(Sgd.)  George  Crook, 

Brigadier  General. 

Headquarters  Army  of  the  United  States. 

Washington,  D.  C.,  March  31st,  1886. 
Telegram. 
General  George  Crook, 

Fort  Bowie,  Arizona. 
You  have  not  acknowledged  receipt  of  my  telegram  of  March 
30th  conveying  instructions  of  the  President.     Inform  me  at  once 
of  this  and  telegraph  me  any  further  information  you  may  have  of 
the  escape  of  the  hostiles  and  the  prospects  of  their  recapture. 

(Sgd.)  P.  H.  Sheridan, 

Lieutenant  General. 


Telegram. 
Headquarters  Department  of  Arizona. 

In  the  Field,  Fort  Bowie,  A.  T.,  March  31st,  1886. 

Lieut.  General  P.  H.  Sheridan. 
Washington,  D.  C. 
In  reply  to  your  dispatch  of  March  thirtieth,  to  enable  you  to 
clearly  understand  situation,  it  should  be  remembered  that  the  hos- 
tiles had  an  agreement  with  Lieut.  Maus  that  they  were  to  be  met 
by  me  twent}r-nve  miles  below  the  line,  that  no  regular  troops  were 
to  be  present.     While  I  was  very  averse  to  such  an  arrangement,  I 


14 

had  to  abide  by  it  as  it  had  already  been  entered  into.  "We  found 
them  in  camp  on  a  rocky  hill  about  five  hundred  yards  from  Lieut. 
Maus  in  such  a  position  that  a  thousand  men  could  not  have  sur 
rounded  them  with  any  possibility  of  capturing  them.  They  were 
able  upon  the  approach  of  an}'  enemy  being  signalled  to  scatter  and 
escape  through  dozens  of  ravines  and  canons  which  would  shelter 
them  from  persuit  until  they  reached  the  higher  ranges  in  the  vi- 
cinity. They  were  armed  to  the  teeth,  having  the  most  improved 
guns  and  all  the  ammunition  they  could  cany.  The  clothing  and 
other  supplies  lost  in  the  fight  with  Crawford  had  been  replaced  b}' 
new  blankets  and  shirts  obtained  in  Mexico.  Lieutenant  Maus  with 
Apache  scouts  was  camped  at  the  nearest  point  the  hostiles  would 
agree  to  his  approaching.  Even  had  I  been  disposed  to  betray  the 
confidence  they  placed  in  me,  it  would  have  been  simply  an  impos- 
sibility to  get  white  troops  to  that  point  either  by  day  or  by  night 
without  their  knowledge,  and  had  I  attempted  to  do  this  the  whole 
band  would  have  stampeded  back  to  the  mountains.  So  suspicious 
were  they  that  never  more  than  from  five  to  eight  of  the  men  came 
into  our  camp  at  one  time,  and  to  have  attempted  the  arrest  of  those 
would  have  stampeded  the  others  to  the  mountains.  Even  after 
the  march  to  Bowie  began  we  were  compelled  to  allow  them  to 
scatter.  They  would  not  march  in  a  body  and  had  any  efforts  been 
made  to  keep  them  together  they  would  have  broken  for  the  moun- 
tains. My  only  hope  was  to  get  their  confidence  on  the  march 
through  Ka-e-te-na.  and  other  confidential  Indians,  and  finally  put 
them  on  the  cars;  and  until  this  was  done  it  was  impossible  even  to 
disarm  them. 

(Sgd.)  George  Crook, 

Brigadier  General, 

Commanding. 


Headquarters  Department  of  Arizona. 

In  the  Field,  Fort  Bowie,  A.  T.,  March  31st,  1886. 

Lieut. -General P.  E.  Sheridan, 
Washington,  B.  C. 
Your  dispatch  of  the  thirtieth  conveying  instructions  of  the 
President  was  received  this  a.  m.,  and  answered  as  soon  as  possi- 
ble. To  inform  the  Indians  that  the  terms  on  which  they  surren- 
dered are  disapproved  would  in  my  judgment  not  only  make  it  im- 
possible for  me  to  negotiate  with  them  but  result  in  their  scattering 
to  the  mountains,  and  I  can't  at  present  see  any  way  to  prevent  it. 


15 

There  is  nothing  further  to  report  with  reference  to  the  escape  of 
the  hostiles,  nor  is  it  probable  I  shall  be  able  to  give  any  positive 
information  until  the  second  or  third  proximo  when  I  can  interview 
the  Indians  now  en  route.  Lieut.  Maus  has  eighty  scouts  and  can 
perhaps  remain  out  a  week  before  he  will  be  obliged  to  return. 
While  it  is  possible  he  may  succeed  in  getting  the  hostiles  to  return 
it  is  extremely  doubtful. 

(Sgd.)  George  Crook, 

Brigadier  General 

Commanding. 


Telegram  received  2:11  p.  m. 

Washington,  D.  C,  April  1st,  1886. 
General  George  Crook, 

Fort  Bowie,  Arizona. 
Your  dispatch  of  March  31st  received.  I  do  not  see  what  you 
can  now  do  except  to  concentrate  your  troops  at  the  best  points  and 
give  protection  to  the  people.  Geronimo  will  undoubtedly  enter 
upon  other  raids  of  murder  and  robbery  and  as  the  offensive  cam- 
paign against  him  with  scouts  has  failed,  would  it  not  be  best  to 
take  up  defensive  and  give  protection  to  the  people  and  business 
interests  of  Arizona  and  Xew  Mexico.  The  Infantry  might  be  sta- 
tioned b}-  companies  or  certain  points  requiring  protection  and  the 
Cavalry  patrol  between  them.  You  have  in  your  Department  43 
companies  of  Infantry  and  40  companies  of  Cavalry  and  ought  to 
be  able  to  do  a  good  deal  with  such  a  force.  Please  send  me  a 
statement  of  what  you  contemplate  for  the  future. 

(Sgd.)  P.  H.  Sheridan, 

Lieutenant  General. 


Telegram. 
Headquarters  Department  of  Arizona, 

In  the  Field,  Fort  Bowie,  A.  T.,  April  1st,  1886. 

Lieut.- General  P.  H.  Sheridan, 

Washington,  D.  C. 
Your  dispatch  of  to-day  received.    It  has  been  my  aim  throughout 
present  operations  to  afford  the  greatest  amount  of  protection  to 
life  and  property  interests  and  troops  have  been  stationed  accord- 


16 

ingly.  Troops  cannot  protect  property  beyond  a  radius  of  one-half 
mile  from  their  camp.  If  offensive  movements  against  the  Indians 
are  not  resumed  they  may  remain  quietly  in  the  mountains  for  an 
indefinite  time  without  crossing  the  line  and  yet  their  very  presence 
there  will  be  a  constant  menace  and  require  the  troops  in  this  De- 
partment to  be  at  all  times  in  position  to  repel  sudden  raids;  and  so 
long  as  any  remain  out  they  will  form  a  nucleus  for  disaffected  In- 
dians from  the  different  agencies  in  Arizona  and  Xew  Mexico,  to 
join.  That  the  operations  of  the  scouts  in  Mexico  have  not  proved 
as  successful  as  was  hoped,  is  due  to  the  enormous  difficulties  they 
have  been  compelled  to  encounter  from  the  nature  of  the  Indians 
the}*  have  been  hunting  and  the  character  of  the  country  in  which 
they  have  operated  and  of  which  persons  not  thoroughly  conver- 
sant with  both  can  have  no  conception.  1  believe  that  the  plan 
upon  which  I  have  conducted  operations  is  the  one  most  likely  to 
prove  successful  in  the  end.  It  may  be  however  that  I  am  too  much 
wedded  to  my  own  views  in  this  matter,  and  as  I  have  spent  nearly 
eight  years  of  the  hardest  work  of  my  life  in  this  Department,  I 
respectfully  request  that  I  may  be  now  relieved  from  its  command. 

(Sgd.)  George  Crook, 

Brigadier  General. 


Telegram. 
Headquarters  Department  of  Arizona, 

In  the  Field,  Fort  Boioie,  A.  T.,  April  2d,  18S6. 
Confidential. 

Lieut.- General  P.  H.  Sheridan. 

Washington.  D.  C. 
The  hostiles  who  did  not  leave  with  Geronimo  arrived  to-day, 
about  eighty,  I  haven't  ascertained  the  exact  number,  some  of  the 
worst  of  the  band  are  among  them.  In  my  judgment  they  should 
be  sent  away  at  once,  as  the  effect  on  those  still  out  would  be  much 
better  than  to  confine  them.  After  the}*  get  to  their  destination,  if 
they  can  be  shown  that  their  future  will  be  better  by  remaining 
than  to  return,  1  think  there  will  be  but  little  difficulty  in  obtaining 
their  consent  to  remain  indefinitely.  When  sent  off  a  guard  should 
accompany  them. 

(Sgd.)  George  Crook, 

Brigadier  General. 


17 

Telegram. 
Headquarters  Department  of  Arizona, 

Lithe  Field,  Fort  Bowie,  A.  T.,  April  3d,  1886. 
Lieut. -General  P.  H.  Sheridan, 

Washington,  D.  C. 
In  an  interview  with  the  hostiles  to-day  after  they  arrived,  I 
learned  that  bad  liquor  was  at  the  bottom  of  the  party  with  Geron- 
imo  and  Natchez  leaving.       They  are  of  the  opinion  that  Lieut. 
Maus  stands  but  little  chance  of  coming  up  with  them. 

(Sgd.)  George  Crook, 

Brigadier  General. 


Telegram  received  3-40-p.  m. 

Washington,  D.  C,  April  3d,  1886. 
General  George  Crook, 

Fort  Bowie,  A rizon  a . 
Your  telegram  of  April  second  received.  Under  authority  from 
the  Secret aiy  of  War  you  will  as  soon  as  practicable  arrange  for 
the  transportation  and  subsistence  of  the  Chiricahua  prisoners  now 
in  your  possession  at  Fort  Bowie  and  send  them  to  Fort  Marion, 
Saint  Augustine,  Florida,  where  they  will  be  turned  over  to  the  C. 
O.  Saint  Francis  Barracks  as  prisoners  under  the  terms  directed  by 
the  President  in  my  telegram  of  March  thirtieth.  Send  with  them, 
under  suitable  officers,  a  sufficient  guard  to  insure  their  safety. 
(Sgd.)  P.  H.  Sheridan, 

Lieutenant  General, 

Commanding . 


Headquarters  Department  of  Arizona, 

In  the  Field,  Fort  Bowie,  A.  T.,  April  4th,  1886. 
Lieut. -General  P.  H.  Sheridan, 

Washington,  D.  C. 

Two  men  of  the  hostiles  who  left  with  Geronimo  are  here  having 
joined  Lieut.  Maus  sixteen  miles  from  this  post  yesterday  and  came 
in  with  him.  They  say  that  they  were  sleeping  together  on  the 
night  of  the  stampede  and  heard  the  others  leaving  and  went  them- 
selves because  they  thought  something  wrong.  After  they  got  out 
and  it  became  light  they  made  up  their  minds  that  there  was  no 
reason  for  leaving.  They  saw  Lieut.  Maus  with  his  scouts  follow- 
ing the  trail  made  by  the  hostiles;  after  hiding  in  the  mountains  for 


18 

a  day  they  concluded  to  return.  They  report  that  there  are  several 
others  with  Geronimo  who  are  very  tired  of  the  life  they  have  been 
living.  Upon  investigation  it  appears  that  a  man  mamed  Tribolett 
who  has  been  selling  the  Indians  large  quantities  of  bad  whiskey  is 
at  the  bottom  of  all  this  trouble.  Lieut.  Maus  followed  the  trail  of 
the  renegades  for  two  days  until  it  broke  up  and  scattered  in  the 
mountains  west  of  Fronteras  and  until  he  became  satisfied  that  fur- 
ther pursuit  would  be  useless. 

{Sgd.)  George  Crook. 

Brigadier  General, 

Commanding. 


Headquarters  Department  of  Arizona, 

In  the  Field,  Fort  Bowk.  A.  T..  April  4th.  1SS6. 
Confidential. 
Lieut. -General  P.  H.  Sheri 

Washington,  D.  C. 
Your  dispatch  of  April  3d  designating  Fort  Marion  as  the  place 
of  confinement  for  the  hostiles  received.  Arrangements  are  being 
made  for  their  transportation  and  they  will  be  sent  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible. I  shall  not  inform  them  that  the  President  has  disapproved 
the  terms  upon  which  I  accepted  their  surrender,  for  the  reason  that 
I  can  communicate  nothing  to  them  through  interpreter  without 
every  one  knowing  what  is  said  and  if  the  fact  was  known,  it  would 
absolutely  prevent  the  return  of  any  of  the  others,  and  unless  this 
war  is  ended  by  the  surrender  of  the  hostiles  it  is  likely  to  last  for 
years.  The  fewer  the  number  that  remain  out  the  more  difficulty 
there  will  be  in  catching  them. 

S  jd. |  George  Crook, 

Brigadier  General. 


Telegram  received  4-15-p.  m, 

Washington,  D.  C  April  5th,  1SS6. 
General  George  Crook, 

Fort  Bowie,  Arizona. 
Your  telegram  of  April  4th.  received.      Your  action  is  approved. 
It  is  the  desire  of  the  President  that  the  prisoners  be  sent  off  with- 
out delay.      Please  inform  me  when  they  will  be  started  and  the 
number  of  men,  women  and  children. 

(Sgd.)  P.  H.  Sheridan, 

Lieutenant  General. 


19 

Telegram  received  7-30,  p.  m. 

Washington,  D.  G,  April  5th,  18S6. 
General  George  Crook, 

Fort  Bowie,  Arizona. 
The  present  terms  not  having  been  agreed  to  here  and  Geronimo 
having  broken  every  condition  of  the  surrender,  the  Indians  now 
in  custody  are  to  be  held  as  prisoners  and  sent  to  Fort  Marion  with- 
out reference  to  previous  communications  and  without  in  any  way 
consulting  their  wishes  in  the  matter.  This  is  in  addition  to  my 
telegram  of  to-day. 

(Sgd.)  P.  H.  Sheridax, 

Lieutenant  General. 


Headquarters  Department  of  Arizoxa, 

In  the  Field,  Fort  Boicie,  A.  T.,  April  7th,  1886. 
Lieut.- General  P.  H.  Sheridan, 

Washington,  D.  C. 
The  Chiricahua  prisoners  numbering  fifteen  men,  among  them 
Chihuahua,  Xana  and  Josanie,  thirty-three  women  and  twenty- 
nine  children  left  Bowie,  Station  about  four  p.  m.  to-day  under 
charge  of  Lieut.  Richards,  Fourth  Cavalry,  escorted  by  a  company 
of  the  Eighth  Infantry.  Among  the  men  were  five  of  the  boldest 
and  ablest  of  the  renegades,  and  three  of  them  were  in  the  raiding 
party  which  did  so  much  killing  in  November  and  December.  To 
avoid  any  possible  trouble  by  reason  of  their  stopping  at  stated 
times  at  stations  en  route,  they  were  sent  by  special  train  as  far  as 
San  Antonio. 

(Sgd.)  George  Crook, 

Brigadier  General. 


On  the  11th  of  April,  in  obedience  to  the  orders  of  the  War  Dept. 
dated  April  2nd,  1883,  I  turned  over  the  command  of  the  Depart- 
ment to  General  Miles. 

The  policy  pursued  by  me  in  the  operations  mentioned  above  has 
been  criticised  as  one  "of  operating  almost  exclusively  with  Indian 
Scouts."  I  am  unwilling  that  such  a  summary  should  be  placed  on 
official  record  without  a  protest,  lest  by  my  silence,  I  should  seem  to 
acquiesce  in  the  justice  of  a  criticism,  which  would  seem  to  imply 
that  the  regular  troops  at  my  disposal  were  not  used  at  all,  or  were 
used  to  little  advantage. 


20 

A  further  criticisirUs  implied  in  the  suggestion  of  the  Lieutenant 
General  that  the  troops  be  used  defensively  for  the  protection  of 
life  and  property.  The  hostiles  were  iu  Mexico;  it  was  therefore 
necessary  to  secure  this  protection,  to  prevent,  if  possible,  their  re- 
crossing  the  line.  To  attain  this  end,  troops  were  stationed  in  de- 
tachments along  the  frontier.  To  each  detachment  was  assigned 
five  Indian  scouts  to  watch  the  front  and  detect  the  approach  of  the 
hostiles.  These  troops  were  stationed  at  every  point  where  it  was 
thought  possible  for  the  hostiles  to  pass.  Every  trail,  every  water- 
hole,  from  the  Patagonia  Mountains  to  the  Rio  Grande  was  thus 
guarded.  The  troops  were  under  the  strictest  orders,  constantly  to 
patrol  this  line,  each  detachment  having  a  particular  section  of 
country  assigned  to  its  special  charge. 

In  addition  to  this,  a  second  line  was  similarly  established  in  rear 
of  the  first,  both  to  act  as  a  reserve,  and  to  prevent  the  passing  of 
any  hostiles  who  might  elude  the  vigilance  of  the  first  line.  Be- 
hind this  again  were  stationed  troops  on  the  railroad  who  might 
be  sent  to  any  desired  point  on  the  whole  front,  forming  thus  a 
third  line. 

The  posts  of  Forts  Thomas.  Grant  and  Bayard,   with  troop 
tioned  at  various  points  on  the  Gila,  at  Ash  Springs,  in   the  Mogol- 
lon  Mountains  and  other  places,  formed  in  reality  a  fourth  line. 

The  approach  of  the  hostiles  toward  any  point  on  the  border  was 
telegraphed  to  all  threatened  points  and  the  citizens  warned  in  ad- 
vance. In  no  case  did  the  hostiles  succeed  in  passing  the  first  line 
of  troops  without  detection  and  pursuit.  All  troops,  wherever 
stationed,  had  orders  to  pursue  vigorously,  and  as  long  as  possible, 
any  hostiles  who  might  come  within  striking  distance.  In  spite, 
however  of  all  the  efforts  of  the  troops  the  hostiles  did  pass 
these  lines  and  the  pursuits  that  ensued,  though  they  were  per- 
sistent, indefatigable  and  untiring,  and  frequently  sue 
ful  in  capturing  the  Indians'  stock,  resulted  in  no  other  loss  to  the 
enemy.  Troops  never  worked  harder  or  more  deserved  success,  but 
during  the  entire  sixteen  months  of  these  operations,  not  a  single 
man.  woman  or  child  of  the  hostiles  was  killed  or  captured  by  the 
troops  of  the  regular  Army. 

It  cannot  be  maintained  that  the  failure  of  the  troops  to  ac- 
complish more  than  they  did.  was  due  to  lack  of  opportunity,  owing 
to  the  disposition  made  of  them.  The  movements  of  the  hostiles 
gave  ample  opportunities  to  the  troops,  and  they  did  not  fail  to  take 
advantage  of  them.  They  did  all  that  could  justly  be  demanded  of 
any  troops. 


•21 

It  will  be  seen  that  persistent  and  constant  ase  was  made  of  the 
regular  troops:  — that  they  were  not  employed  in  service  for  which 
they  were  not  fitted  should  certainly  not  be  a  reason  for  an  implied 
censure.  For  the  zeal  and  energy  displayed  by  them,  and  for  the 
privations  and  hardships  uncomplainingly  endured  in  pursuing  these 
Indians,  too  much  praise  cannot  be  given  them. 

But  a  mere  passive  defence  would  not  alone  suffice  to  protect  cit- 
izens or  property;  as  long  as  the  Indians  remained  at  large,  there 
could  be  no  safety.  A  few  of  these  Chiricahuas,  with  the  ability 
the}'  had  of  traveling  with  almost  marvelous  rapidity  over  great 
distances,  could  have  kept  the  Territories  of  Arizona  and  New  Mexico 
in  a  state  of  constant  terror.  The  raid  of  eleven  of  these  Indians 
through  these  Territories  in  1885  sufficiently  indicates  this.  The 
smallness  of  their  number,  only  rendered  their  escape  easier,  and 
their  movements  more  difficult  to  detect.  Protection  must  therefore 
be  sought,  not  only  in  defensive  measures,  which  could  not  prevent 
the  passage  of  the  Indians  across  a  line  of  over  a  thousand  miles  in 
length,  and  at  best  could  only  detect  their  passage  within  a  short 
time  after  it  had  been  effected,  but  the  hostiles  must  be  subjugated 
and  placed  under  control.  Therefore,  in  addition  to  the  measures 
above  described,  two  commands,  consisting  each  of  a  picked  troop 
of  cavalry  and  100  Indian  scouts,  were  organized  to  follow  the  hos- 
tiles south  of  the  border.  They  were  reduced  to  the  minimum  of 
impedimenta  consistent  with  the  nature  of  the  arduous  duty  assigned 
to  them,  which  was  to  follow  the  hostiles  wherever  they  went,  strike 
them  wherever  they  were  found,  and  pursue  them  incessantly  until 
they  were  killed,  captured,  or  until  they  should  sue  for  peace.  In 
this  service  the  cavalry,  picked  though  it  was,  proved  to  be  really  an 
inpediment  to  successful  operations,  and  was  subsequently  relieved, 
on  the  recommendation  of  the  officers  in  command  of  these  expedi- 
tions. 

To  these  mixed  commands  of  picked  cavalry  and  Indian  scouts, 
was  specially  intrusted  the  task  of  subjugating  the  hostiles. 

The  use  of  these  scouts,  in  this  way,  has  been  made  the  subject 
of  adverse  criticism,  and  I  desire  here  to  express  my  convictions 
with  regard  to  it.  Nearly  eight  years  of  my  life  have  been  spent  in 
Arizona,  and  much  of  that  time  in  actual  hostilities  with  Apache 
Indians.  I  am  therefore  entitled  to  speak  from  the  knowledge 
gained  through  experience,  and  I  cannot  too  strongly  assert,  that 
there  has  never  been  anj"  success  in  operations  against  these  In- 
dians, unless  Indian  scouts  were  used  either  as  auxiliaries  or  inde- 
pendent of  other  support.     Regular  troops  have  always  failed  on 


22 

our  side  of  the  boundary  line,  and  any  apparent  success  in  Mexican 
operations  has  been  attained  by  the  grossest  treachery,  the  effect 
of  which  has  been  to  make  the  Indians,  if  possible,  even  more 
suspicious  and  savage  than  before,  and  to  infuriate  them  to  fresh 
outrag 

I  assert,  moreover,  without  reserve  or  qualification  of  an}' nature, 
that  these  Chiricahua  scouts,  under  Chiefs  Chatto.  Xoche  and 
others,  did  most  excellent  service,  and  were  of  more  value  in  hunting 
down,  and  compelling  the  surrender  of  the  renegades  than  all  other 
troops  engaged  in  operations  against  them,  combined,  The  reports 
circulated  to  the  effect  that  they  were  disloyal,  and  unwilling  to  fight 
the  renegades  are  absolutely  false.  It  has  been  said  that  the  hos- 
tiles  obtained  ammunition,  suppli  ince  and  reinforcements 

from  the  scouts,  and  from  those  who  remained  on  the  reservation: 
this  statement,  in  whatever  form  repeated,  is  entirely  incorrect. 

During  the  whole  of  the  sixteen  months  following  the  departure  of 
the  renegades,  up  to  their  final  surrender,  they  did  not  receive  an  ad- 
dition of  a  single  Apache  from  the  reservation.  It  is  true  that  the  hos- 
tiles  at  several  different  times  obtained  cartridges  from  the  bodies 
of  scouts  and  soldiers  "whom  they  had  killed;  and  in  other  instances 
considerable  amounts  in  camps  wmich  they  attacked,  as  for  instance 
in  Guadalupe  Canon  in  June.  1885,  when  they  killed  three  men 
belonging  to  a  detachment  of  Captain  Lawton's  command,  and  cap 
tured  probably  two  or  three  thousand  rounds  of  fixed  ammunition; 
and  in  another  instance,  when  Xatchez  and  other  Indians  attacked 
Captain  Hatfield's  troop  in  May.  1886. 

It  has  been  alleged,  that  while  the  Chiricahua  scouts  could  be  de- 
pended upon  to  use  their  best  efforts  "to  capture  or  induce  the  sur- 
render of  the  hostiles,  they  had  no  wish  to  kill  their  own  kindred." 

It  may  well  be  questioned  whether  it  be  the  policy  of  the  Govern- 
ment simply  and  absolutely  to  kill  a  number  of  Indians:  or  to 
restore  peace,  and  secure  the  safety  of  its  citizens.  The 
instructions  given  to  me  plainly  and  specifically  authorized 
me  to  secure  the  surrender  of  the  hostiles,  without  con- 
ditions if  possible,  with  conditions  if  necessary.  It  was  not  until 
niy  successor  assumed  command  that  orders  were  given  "looking 
to  the  destruction  or  capture  of  the  hostiles,"  simply. 

But  the  facts  do  not  support  the  theory  that  the  scouts  would  not 
kill  the  hostiles.  On  the  contrary,  during  the  entire  course  of  the 
operations  against  them,  from  May.  1885,  to  the  surrender  to  Gen- 
eral Miles  of  the  party  under  Xatchez  and  Geronimo  in  September, 
!,  the  only  hostiles  killed  or  captured  were  in  encounters  with 


outs  alone,  except  two  men.  one  of  whom  was  killed  by  a 
White  Mountain  Indian,  near  Fort  Apache,  and  the  other  by  an 
American  near  Fronteras  in  Mexico,  in  March.  1880.  During  the 
entire  campaign,  from  first  to  last,  without  an}-  exception,  every 
successful  encounter  with  the  hostiles  was  due  exclusively  to  the 
exertions  of  Indian  scouts,  and  it  is  the  unanimous  testimony 
of  officers  commanding  scout  companies,  that  the  Chiricahuas  were 
the  most  subordinate,  energetic,  untiring,  and  by  odds,  the  most 
efficient  of  their  commands.  The  use  of  Indian  scouts  was  indeed 
a  feature  of  my  policy  in  dealing  with  the  renegade  Apaches,  and 
one  which  my  own  experience  in  former  campaigns  in  Nevada, 
Idaho.  California.  Oregon,  Washington,  Arizona  and  in  the  Sioux 
troubles  in  1876  and  '77.  as  well  as  that  of  soldiers  the  world  over, 
afford  convincing  proof  that  it  is  a  feature  of  great  value,  and  that 
results  are  obtained  by  the  use  of  these  auxiliaries,  that  cannot  be 
obtained  in  any  other  way.  As  a  military  principle,  it  is  not  the 
part  of  wisdom  to  neglect  an  auxiliary  force  which  has  proved  al- 
ways useful  and  at  times  indispensable.  In  the  military  service 
universally,  men  have  been,  so  far  as  possible,  assigned  to  the  work 
they  are  best  qualified  to  perform.  The  Chiricahua  Apache, both  by 
nature  and  education,  is  beyond  cavil,  better  qualified  than  any  one 
else  for  the  warfare  which  for  years  past  has  been  carried  on 
in  the  mountains  of  Arizona  and  Mexico.  The  use  of  Indian  scouts 
is  therefore  dictated  by  the  soundest  principles  of  military  policy. 

In  his  annual  report  for  1886,  the  Lieutenant  General  says  that  he 
thinks  that  these  scouts  "were  faithful  as  far  as  to  try  to  capture 
or  induce  the  surrender  of  the  hostiles."  On  this  ground  alone,  the 
employment  of  these  scouts  would  be  amply  justified.  In  the  same 
report  it  is  also  stated  that  but  for  the  unfortunate  assassination  of 
Captain  Crawford  by  Mexican  troops,  he  would  "have  terminated 
the  cruel  and  blood}'  atrocities  which  continued  thereafter  for  many 
months/"  It  is  necessary  to  add  to  this  statement,  that  Captain 
Crawford's  command  consisted  of  Indian  scouts  only. 

Not  only  as  an  efficient  fighting  force  were  these  scouts  valuable. 
Their  employment  in  communicating  with  the  hostiles,  who  could 
never  have  been  reached  without  their  aid.  and  their  services,  in 
bringing  about  the  disintegration  and  surrender  of  the  hostile  bands, 
were  of  very  great  value.  Without  the  use  of  scouts,  the  surrender 
of  the  Chiricahuas  in  1883  would  have  been  impossible.  Without 
them,  the  surrender  of  the  whole  body  of  the  hostiles  in  March  1886 
could  not  have  taken  place.  Although  in  this  last  case,  some  of 
them  escaped  after  the  surrender,  it  should  not  be  overlooked  that 


U 

as  its  result,  and  in  accordance  with  its  terms,  seventy  seven  of  the 
renegades  were  sent  to  Florida,  leaving  but  thirty  three  men,  women 
and  children  in  the  band  under  Natchez  and  Geronimo.- 

And  finally,  the  surrender  to  my  successor,  of  this  party  was  ac- 
complished solely  by  the  use,  not  only  of  scouts,  but  of  Chiricahua 
scouts.  The  report  of  the  Lieutenant  General  allows  the  inference 
to  be  made  that  this  was  due  to  a  departure  from  the  methods  em- 
ployed by  me.  and  resulted  from  the  use  exclusively  of  regular  troops. 
The  fact  is  that  after  an  experience  of  months,  absolutely  without 
gaining  one  step,  during  which  time  troops,  horses  and  pack-trains 
had  been  worked  beyond  the  limit  of  endurance,  and  citizens.  Mexi- 
cans, and  friendly  Indians  of  other  tribes,  had  been  employed  in 
vain.  Lieutenant  Gatewood  with  the  aid  of  two  Chiricahua  Apaches, 
obtained  the  surrender.  In  other  words,  the  campaign  was  closed 
only  by  a  return  to  the  methods  which  constituted  the  distinctive 
feature  of  the  policy  adopted  and  followed  by  me. 

It  is  difficult  to  arrive  at  the  true  conditions  accepted  by  the  In- 
dians in  this  surrender,  and  the  question  is  of  little  importance,  so 
far  as  this  discussion  goes.  One  fact,  however,  is  certain,  the  ef- 
forts of  the  troops  in  the  field,  had  little  or  nothing  to  do  with  it. 

The  difficulties  and  cost,  both  in  life  and  money,  of  protracted  In- 
dian wars,  are  too  well  known  to  need  discussion.  They  have  ever 
been  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  results  obtained.  The  Seminole 
War,  lasting  through  eight  years  of  constant  warfare,  cost  thousands 
of  lives,  and  between  twenty  and  thirty  millions  of  dollars. 

;The  power  of  the  Army  aided  by  deception,  fraud  and  perfidy 
was  tried  in  vain. "  but  the  Seminoles  were  never  conquered  by  force 
of  arms,  and  peace  was  at  last  obtained  with  the  inauguration  of  a 
different  policy.  The  confidence  of  one  of  their  most  powerful 
chiefs  was  gained  by  an  act  of  simple  justice,  and  by  means  of  ne- 
gotiations carried  on  through  this  chief,  a  portion  of  them  were 
induced  to  surrender,  with  the  understanding  that  the}*  should  be 
moved  beyond  the  Mississippi.  The  first  Indians  sent  west  induced 
a  disposition  on  the  part  of  those  who  remained  to  follow.  The 
wedge  had  been  inserted,  and  time  alone  was  required  to  drive  it 
home. 

There  are  many  parallel  points  in  the  Seminole  and  Apache  Wars, 
among  which  may  be  distinguished  as  especially  pertinent,  the  diffi- 
culty of  operating. presented  by  the  natural  features  of  the  country. 

*ilangus  and  his  party,  eleven  in  number  had 8e perated  from  the  others  soon 
after  leaving  the  reservation,  and  had  taken  no  part,  so  far  as  can  he  learned, 
in  any  of  the  outrages  committed  by  the  renegade^. 


In  both  cases  it  was  almost  impossible,  to  get  within  strik- 
ing distance  of  the  hostiles.  It  was  the  ability  on  the  part  of  the 
Indians  to  evade  their  pursuers  which  prolonged  the  Seminole  War. 
and  the  Apaches  posessed  the  same  advantage,  although  in  a  very 
much  greater  degree.  In  the  Seminole  War.  the  force  of  arms  and 
fighting  accomplished  little  more  than  the  destruction  of  the  Indian 
villages  and  their  contents. and  the  capture  of  women  and  children. 
After  many  years  of  costly  war,  negotiation  succeeded  where  arms 
had  failed.  The  same  is  true  of  the  Apache  campaign,  except  that 
from  the  first  the  utility  of  negotiation,  through  and  by  means  of 
the  Indians  themselves,  was  recognized.  As  in  the  Seminole,  so 
in  the  Apache  war,  the  surrendered  Indians  were  sent  to  a  distant 
part  of  the  country.  In  one  case  as  in  the  other,  the  ties  of  friend- 
ship, and  love  for  kindred,  wives  and  children,  were  the  strong  in 
centives  which  induced  the  Indians  who  remained  out  to  surrender. 
Very  respectfully. 

Your  obedient  servant, 

GEORGE  CROOK, 

Brigadier  General, 

Commanding. 


44758 


